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U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS AND 
SEX OFFENDER LEGISLATION: EVIDENCE 
OF EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY? 
CHRISTINA MANCINI* & DANIEL P. MEARS** 
In the past two decades, the federal government and states have 
enacted a wide range of new laws that target sex offenders.  A series of U.S. 
Supreme Court cases has addressed the constitutionality of such legislation 
and, in so doing, contributed to the current policy landscape.  The Court’s 
influence is noteworthy in part because of the calls during this same time 
period for evidence-based policy.  Does the influence, however, reflect not 
only the legal considerations that necessarily attend to these cases but also 
an accurate and balanced assessment of social science theory and 
research?  We address this question by examining Supreme Court cases 
from 1991 to 2011 involving sex crime laws.  The findings indicate that the 
Court demonstrates an awareness of scientific research by referencing it in 
almost all decisions involving sex offender legislation, yet the Court 
frequently overstates or misinterprets empirical findings.  Implications for 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions constitute the “law of the land”—that is, 
they have the potential to affirm, modify, and even overturn public policy.1  
For example, the 1972 decision Furman v. Georgia prohibited states from 
imposing capital punishment pursuant to statutes allowing unbridled 
discretion of the judge or of the jury,2 while the 1976 decision Gregg v. 
Georgia enabled them to resume using it.3  Such an influence on public 
policy historically has derived from the Court’s interpretation of contested 
constitutional issues.  However, scholars have argued that the influence 
increasingly involves interpretation and use of social science research.4  The 
greater accessibility of such research, for example, “has made American 
law receptive to valid science to an unprecedented degree.”5  Indeed, the 
Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals6 requires 
courts to “evaluate the research methods supporting expert evidence and the 
principles used to extrapolate from that research to the task at hand.”7  
 
1 See BARBARA ANN STOLZ, CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICYMAKING: FEDERAL ROLES AND PROCESSES 
4 (2002). 
2 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam). 
3 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (holding that the concerns regarding 
arbitrary or capricious imposition of capital punishment can be addressed by carefully 
drafted statutes that ensure the sentencing authority is given adequate guidance).  
4 See, e.g., Michael Heise, Brown v. Board of Education, Footnote 11, and 
Multidisciplinarity, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 279, 310–14 (2005). 
5 David L. Faigman & John Monahan, Psychological Evidence at the Dawn of the Law’s 
Scientific Age, 56 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 631, 631 (2005). 
6 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 595–98 (1993). 
7 Faigman & Monahan, supra note 5, at 654. 
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Thus, in addition to settling questions of law, judges and Justices must also 
be able to consider and assess social scientific research. 
This requirement presents substantial challenges for judges because 
legal education typically does not include training in research methods or 
statistics, or, by extension, instruction in how to interpret the results of 
empirical research studies, especially when such studies involve 
complicated questions involving research design, measurement, sampling, 
or analysis.8  Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia has emphasized this 
point.  In his dissenting opinion in Roper v. Simmons, a case in which the 
Court prohibited the execution of juveniles, he remarked, “Given the 
nuances of scientific methodology and conflicting views, courts . . . are ill 
equipped to determine which view of science is the right one.”9  Notably, 
the problem is central to the Court’s decisions in cases that affect many 
prominent criminal justice policies.  The findings from empirical research, 
for example, have been cited in such landmark cases as McCleskey v. Kemp 
(racial discrimination and capital punishment),10 Atkins v. Virginia 
(execution of the mentally handicapped),11 and District of Columbia v. 
Heller (gun control).12 
This use of social scientific research in Court decisions has occurred as 
policymakers and practitioners have increasingly emphasized the 
importance of evidence-based policy,13 which draws on credible research to 
support the assumptions on which it is premised.14  Given the Court’s 
prominence in shaping policy,15 and its use of empirical research in some 
decisions,16 the question arises: How is the social scientific research 
 
8 See generally John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Twenty-Five Years of Social Science 
in Law, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 72 (2011) (discussing case law that requires judges to 
assess the validity of the methods supporting expert evidence). 
9 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 618 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
10 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286–90 (1987) (discussing social science studies 
showing racial disparities in the imposition of the death penalty). 
11 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002) (citing psychological studies indicating 
that individuals with lower than average intelligence have more difficulty anticipating the 
consequences of their actions than those with higher intelligence). 
12 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577 (2008) (citing empirical legal 
scholarship examining the interpretation of the Second Amendment). 
13 See, e.g., Michael R. Smith & Geoffrey P. Alpert, Searching for Direction: Courts, Social 
Science, and the Adjudication of Racial Profiling Claims, 19 JUST. Q. 673, 699–701 (2002). 
14 DANIEL P. MEARS, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY: AN EVALUATION APPROACH 
TO INCREASING ACCOUNTABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS 1 (2010). 
15 See STOLZ, supra note 1, at 4, 5, 11. 
16 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954) (citing an array of 
social science studies to support its opinion on the effect of segregation on children); see 
also Rachel F. Moran, What Counts as Knowledge? A Reflection on Race, Social Science, 
and the Law, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 515, 536 (2010) (discussing the risks and benefits of 
1118 CHRISTINA MANCINI & DANIEL P. MEARS [Vol. 103 
interpreted?  For example, does the Court interpret scholarship in a manner 
that accords broadly with the state of empirical evidence and not only that 
from select studies?  Does the Court acknowledge competing claims 
supported by different bodies of empirical research?  If it does, then its 
decisions arguably rest on an evidence-based foundation.  If it does not, 
then, conversely, its decisions arguably lack an evidence-based foundation. 
Against this backdrop, the goal of this study is to supplement 
scholarship on the Court’s role in contributing to evidence-based crime and 
criminal justice policy.  To this end, we focus on a largely neglected area of 
investigation—the Court’s role in upholding, reversing, or modifying sex 
crime laws, and, in particular, whether the Court not only has drawn on 
social science but has accurately interpreted extant scholarship.  This focus 
stems from two considerations.  First, sex crime laws have proliferated 
during a period of time in which courts increasingly have evaluated 
research that bears on legal decisions.17  Second, many of these laws 
proceed from faulty assumptions about sex crime.18  
Accordingly, this study examines all Supreme Court decisions from 
1991 to 2011 that focused on sex crimes or sex offenders.  We address two 
research questions.  First, to what extent does the Court make reference to 
scholarly work in its decisions?  Second, is the Court’s use and 
interpretation of research in these cases consistent with findings from a 
larger body of scholarship centered on understanding sexual offending?  
Specifically, Part II of the study describes the Supreme Court’s role in 
affecting public policy and its use of social science research in rendering 
decisions.  Part III reviews prominent sex crime laws enacted nationally.  In 
Part IV, we examine Supreme Court decisions concerning the 
constitutionality of these reforms.  Study methodology is outlined in Part V.  
 
“using social science evidence to reconsider fundamental normative commitments” in cases 
such as Brown). 
17 See Andrew J. Harris & Arthur J. Lurigio, Introduction to Special Issue on Sex 
Offenses and Offenders: Toward Evidence-Based Public Policy, 37 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 
477, 478 (2010). 
18 See Candace Kruttschnitt et al., Predictors of Desistance Among Sex Offenders: The 
Interaction of Formal and Informal Social Controls, 17 JUST. Q. 61, 83 (2000); Wayne A. 
Logan, Megan’s Laws as a Case Study in Political Stasis, 61 SYRACUSE L. REV. 371, 406 
(2010); Lisa L. Sample, Policy Essay, The Need to Debate the Fate of Sex Offender Community 
Notification Laws, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 265, 267 (2011); Richard Tewksbury & 
Wesley G. Jennings, Assessing the Impact of Sex Offender Registration and Community 
Notification on Sex-Offending Trajectories, 37 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 570, 580 (2010); Corey 
Rayburn Yung, Sex Offender Exceptionalism and Preventive Detention, 101 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 969, 973 (2011); Michael R. Handler, Comment, A Law of Passion, Not of 
Principle, Nor Even Purpose: A Call to Repeal or Revise the Adam Walsh Act Amendments to 
the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 279, 281 (2011). 
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Findings are presented in the subsequent section, Part VI.  Finally, in Part 
VII, we conclude with a discussion of the study’s implications for theory, 
research, and policy. 
II. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT, POLICY, AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 
Scholars have long observed that U.S. Supreme Court decisions 
constitute a form of public policy.  For example, Barbara Ann Stolz has 
emphasized that the Court, through its interpretation of the law, engages in 
policymaking directly affecting the actions of law enforcement, corrections, 
and, more broadly, the criminal justice system.19  Recently, Richard D. 
Hartley and Rob Tillyer showed how the Court’s decisions have 
substantially altered sentencing laws.20  There are, to be sure, clear limits to 
the Court’s influence on policy.  The Court can only hear cases brought 
before it, and there may be substantial gaps between what its decisions 
require and how well these requirements are implemented in the criminal 
justice system; even so, Court decisions have the potential to affect crime 
reforms by, among other things, ruling that they are unconstitutional.21 
Court rulings derive from several sources, but historically social 
science research has not been one of them.22  Indeed, prior to the 1900s, the 
Court had not relied on social science research in an opinion.23  At the turn 
of the century, however, a shift occurred.  In Muller v. Oregon, Louis D. 
Brandeis, acting as a litigator, submitted a brief to the Court that cited 
research describing the negative effects of long industrial work hours on 
women.24  The Court referenced this research to help justify its decision in 
Muller.25  This recognition of empirical work “is considered a watershed in 
the Supreme Court’s use of social science research evidence . . . .”26 
A half-century later, in one of its most famous cases, Brown v. Board 
of Education, the Court drew heavily on psychological and educational 
research.27  Since then, social scientific research increasingly has surfaced 
 
19 See STOLZ, supra note 1, at 177.  
20 Richard D. Hartley & Rob Tillyer, Defending the Homeland: Judicial Sentencing 
Practices for Federal Immigration Offenses, 29 JUST. Q. 76, 78–79 (2012). 
21 See STOLZ, supra note 1, at 4–5, 177.  
22 See Monahan & Walker, supra note 8, at 73.  
23 Id. at 76. 
24 Brief for Defendant in Error at 19, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (No. 107). 
25 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419 (1908). 
26 James R. Acker, Thirty Years of Social Science in Supreme Court Criminal Cases, 12 
LAW & POL’Y 1, 2 (1990). 
27 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954) (citing psychological research 
showing the detrimental effects of segregation on African-American students in finding that 
separate educational facilities are inherently unequal). 
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in the proceedings and decisions of American courts.28  More recently, 
Shawn D. Bushway and Anne Morrison Piehl emphasized that “it is clear 
that social science can and will be taken into account by legal actors such as 
the Supreme Court.”29  How the Court uses social science research varies.  
Justices may obtain information from briefs submitted by the parties or 
amicus curiae.  As but one example, the American Psychological 
Association et al. submitted an amici curiae brief that argued against 
mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole for juveniles 
convicted of homicide offenses in Miller v. Alabama.30  The brief argued, in 
part, that psychological research strongly indicates that juveniles are not as 
capable as adults of anticipating the consequences of their actions and, as a 
result, should not be held as culpable as adults for their offenses.31  The 
Court appeared persuaded by the evidence presented in the brief,32 as it 
reversed the practice, finding that mandatory life without parole sentences 
for juveniles amounted to cruel and unusual punishment.  In contrast, some 
accounts suggest that Justices may occasionally undertake independent 
literature searches.33  To date, studies of the Supreme Court’s use of 
research have focused on such dimensions as the number of citations 
mentioned in court decisions,34 the role of amicus curiae briefs and judicial 
decisionmaking,35 and the influence of expert testimony.36  Notably, 
however, basic questions remain about the extent to which the Court draws 
on research and whether it does so accurately.  Over twenty years ago, in a 
 
28 See John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Judicial Use of Social Science Research, 15 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 571, 581 (1991). 
29 See Shawn D. Bushway & Anne Morrison Piehl, Social Science Research and the Legal 
Threat to Presumptive Sentencing Guidelines, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 461, 479 (2007). 
30 Brief for the American Psychological Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners at 3–4, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646 & 10-9647). 
31 Id. at 7–14.  
32 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 n.5 (2012); see also Graham v. Florida, 130 
S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (citing an amicus curiae brief as providing support for the finding 
that psychology and brain science research indicate significant differences between juvenile 
and adult minds). 
33 ROSEMARY J. ERICKSON & RITA J. SIMON, THE USE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA IN 
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 32, 154 (1998); J. Alexander Tanford, The Limits of a Scientific 
Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court and Psychology, 66 IND. L.J. 137, 143 n.56 (1991).  
34 Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 
96 CALIF. L. REV. 63, 74, 82 n.72 (2008).  
35 See generally Karen O’Connor & Lee Epstein, Amicus Curiae Participation in the 
U.S. Supreme Court: An Appraisal of Hakman’s “Folklore,” 16 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 311 
(1982) (concluding that amicus curiae participation by private groups is the norm rather than 
the exception).  
36 See Ronald Roesch et al., Social Science and the Courts: The Role of Amicus Curiae 
Briefs, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 3 (1991).  
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review of Supreme Court reliance on scientific research, James R. Acker 
concluded that “we know little about such basic matters as . . . what kinds 
of references are utilized” and whether the Court summarized research 
findings in a manner consistent with the state of scientific research.37  That 
assessment remains largely the same today.38 
III. SEX OFFENDER LAWS 
The U.S. Supreme Court renders decisions on a broad range of issues 
each year.  This fact makes it difficult to assess not only the Court’s use of 
social science research but also the extent to which the research is 
accurately represented.  One strategic avenue through which to investigate 
this issue, however, is to focus on the Court’s decisions in a particular 
policy arena.  Here, we adopt this approach and focus on sex offender laws 
for three reasons.  First, the federal government and state legislatures have 
been active in developing and implementing an array of sex offender 
reforms in recent decades.  Second, per some accounts, sex crime laws 
appear to reflect panic-driven responses that have resulted from 
misperceptions about sexual offending.  Some scholars have observed that 
the emergence of sex crime reforms has not followed an increase in sexual 
offending;39 indeed, in the last decade and a half, reports of forcible rape 
offenses involving adults40 and offenses involving children41 have steadily 
declined across the United States.  As a result, scholars have identified 
public fear and anxiety about a putatively dangerous population driven to 
reoffend as potential catalysts of the proliferation of ever more sex crime 
laws.42  Third, the Supreme Court has heard several cases involving these 
initiatives.  Collectively, these circumstances present an opportunity to 
examine the Court’s decisions in cases challenging these controversial laws, 
along with the Court’s use and interpretation of social science research in 
 
37 See Acker, supra note 26, at 3. 
38 Craig Haney & Deana Dorman Logan, Broken Promise: The Supreme Court’s 
Response to Social Science Research on Capital Punishment, 50 J. SOC. ISSUES 75, 83 
(1994).  See generally Monahan & Walker, supra note 28. 
39 See, e.g., TRACY VELÁZQUEZ, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE PURSUIT OF SAFETY: SEX 
OFFENDER POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 4–5 (2008).  
40 MICHAEL PLANTY ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
FEMALE VICTIMS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE, 1994-2010, at 1 fig.1 (2013). 
41 David Finkelhor & Lisa Jones, Have Sexual Abuse and Physical Abuse Declined Since the 
1990s?, CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN RESEARCH CTR. 3 (2012), available at http://www.unh.edu/
ccrc/pdf/CV267_Have%20SA%20%20PA%20Decline_FACT%20SHEET_11-7-12.pdf. 
42 See, e.g., Christina Mancini, Examining Factors that Predict Public Concern About the 
Collateral Consequences of Sex Crime Policy, CRIM. JUST. POL’Y. REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
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majority opinions.  This Part highlights the types of sex offender reforms 
enacted nationally. 
Since the early 1990s, all states have enacted new sex crime laws.43  
This change was spurred, in part, by federal legislation that required states 
to create sex offender registries and notification policies.44  These laws aim 
to promote public awareness of offenders’ presence and, at the same time, 
increase law enforcement monitoring of offenders.45  Other sex offender 
laws have also been enacted.  For example, states have passed legislation 
that allows sex offenders to be civilly committed and released only when 
mental health professionals deem them no longer a risk to the community.46  
Some states now require that convicted sex offenders receive mandatory 
treatment, including chemical castration.47  Still other laws have targeted 
sex offenders.  For example, in recognition that victims may not be able or 
willing to immediately report sex crimes, some states have created 
legislation that allows sex offenders to be prosecuted beyond the statutes of 
limitations.48 
Many states increasingly have enacted tougher sentencing guidelines 
for cases involving child victims.  These laws do not always involve 
physical contact.  For example, child pornography laws sometimes include 
penalties for individuals convicted of accessing child pornography,49 even 
when the depictions consist of virtual or computer-generated images of 
children engaging in sex acts.50  The focus on protecting child victims is 
reflected in laws that have allowed convicted child rapists to be executed.  
 
43 For a recent compilation of state laws, see Christina Mancini et al., It Varies from 
State to State: An Examination of Sex Crime Laws Nationally, 24 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 
166, 189–92 (2013).  
44 See Sample, supra note 18, at 267; Richard Tewksbury, Sex Offender Registries as a 
Tool for Public Safety: Views from Registered Offenders, 7 W. CRIMINOLOGY REV. 1, 2 (2006).  
45 See Mancini et al., supra note 43, at 169. 
46 Dennis M. Doren, Recidivism Base Rates, Predictions of Sex Offender Recidivism, and 
the “Sexual Predator” Commitment Laws, 16 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 97, 97 (1998). 
47 William M. Burdon & Catherine A. Gallagher, Coercion and Sex Offenders: 
Controlling Sex-Offending Behavior Through Incapacitation and Treatment, 29 CRIM. JUST. 
& BEHAV. 87, 95 (2002); Linda S. Grossman et al., Are Sex Offenders Treatable? A 
Research Overview, 50 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 349, 351 (1999).  
48 Ashran Jen, Comment, Stogner v. California: A Collision Between the Ex Post Facto 
Clause and California’s Interest in Protecting Child Sex Abuse Victims, 94 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 723, 728 (2004).  For a compilation of state sex crime statutes, see Mancini et 
al., supra note 43, at 189–92.  
49 JANIS WOLAK ET AL., OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, 
CHILD-PORNOGRAPHY POSSESSORS ARRESTED IN INTERNET-RELATED CRIMES: FINDINGS FROM 
THE NATIONAL JUVENILE ONLINE VICTIMIZATION STUDY at ix, 19–20 (2005).  
50 PHILIP JENKINS, BEYOND TOLERANCE: CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ON THE INTERNET 37 (2001).  
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Prior to 2008, at least six states permitted the execution of sex offenders 
convicted of aggravated sex crimes against a child.51 
Not least, federal legislation enacted in 2006, the Adam Walsh Child 
Protection and Safety Act (AWA), requires that states, tribal jurisdictions, 
and U.S. territories impose additional restrictions on released sex 
offenders.52  Under Title I of the AWA, the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act (SORNA), convicted sex offenders are required to register 
within a certain period of time when moving from one jurisdiction to 
another or face felony charges.53  Individuals who do not register within the 
mandated time period face incarceration as a possible sanction.54 
IV. SEX CRIME LAWS AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 
In response to challenges to sex offender laws over the past twenty 
years, the U.S. Supreme Court has issued decisions reflecting the laws’ 
diversity.  Decisions have addressed cases involving civil commitment, 
child pornography, sex offender treatment, notification policies, registries, 
extensions of statutes of limitations for sex crimes, capital punishment for 
rapists, and SORNA.  This Part briefly reviews key Court decisions since 
1991.55  For parsimony, we describe cases that address different policies.  
The descriptions serve both to convey the range of policies and provide 
context for the subsequent analyses. 
Kansas v. Hendricks:56 Respondent Hendricks claimed that Kansas’s 
civil commitment statute violated the Due Process, Double Jeopardy, and 
Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Constitution.  The Court found that the law 
provided strict procedural safeguards and that the Act did not generate 
additional criminal proceedings and therefore was not punitive. 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition:57 The Supreme Court considered 
whether the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA), which 
banned virtual or computer-generated images of children engaging in sex 
 
51 Joan Biskupic, Justices Reject Death Penalty for Child Rapists: Court Limits Use of 
Capital Punishment, USA TODAY, June 26, 2008, at A4. 
52 Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 10, 18, 21, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
53 Id. 120 Stat. at 590–611 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–16962 (2006) and 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2250 (2012)). 
54 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a); see also Andrew J. Harris & Christopher Lobanov-Rostovsky, 
Implementing the Adam Walsh Act’s Sex Offender Registration and Notification Provisions: 
A Survey of the States, 21 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 202, 204–05 (2010).  
55 As we discuss infra, these cases touch on a wide range of distinct sex offender policies 
that states and the federal government have enacted. 
56 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
57 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
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acts, unduly restricted freedom of speech.  The Court ruled that the CPPA 
was overly broad and restrictive and therefore was unconstitutional. 
McKune v. Lile:58 Respondent Lile, a convicted sex offender in the 
custody of the Kansas Department of Corrections, challenged the tenets of a 
treatment program that required him to admit guilt for his offense.  Lile 
argued that an admission would violate his Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination.  The Court ruled that the treatment approach 
served a “vital penological purpose” and did not violate Lile’s Fifth 
Amendment right.59 
Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe:60 Respondent Doe, a 
convicted sex offender, challenged a Connecticut community notification 
law that required pictures of all sex offenders and their locations to be 
posted on a state website.  Doe claimed that because the law did not allow 
him to demonstrate his low-risk status as a sex offender, posting his picture 
and personal information on the state website violated his constitutional 
rights, including his right to due process protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The Court rejected Doe’s claims that the law was punitive in 
nature and found that the website served to protect the public. 
Smith v. Doe:61 Respondents Doe I and Doe II challenged an Alaska 
law requiring retroactive registration for offenders who committed sex 
crimes prior to the passage of the 1994 Act.  Both petitioners were released 
from prison and completed rehabilitative programs for sex offenders.  
Although Doe I and Doe II were convicted of their sex crimes before the 
Act’s passage, they were still required to register.  They claimed that the 
law was retroactive and punitive and thus violated their constitutional 
rights.  The Court disagreed; it decided that the law served a regulatory, 
public safety purpose and thus found that it did not violate the Ex Post 
Facto Clause of the Constitution. 
Stogner v. California:62 Petitioner Stogner challenged a California 
statute that permitted prosecution for sex-related child abuse when the prior 
limitations period had expired if the prosecution began within one year of 
the victim’s report to law enforcement.  The Supreme Court found that the 
law had been applied retroactively and thus was unconstitutional. 
Kennedy v. Louisiana:63 Petitioner Kennedy was convicted of an 
aggravated sex crime in Louisiana and sentenced to death.  He claimed that 
 
58 McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002). 
59 Id. at 29. 
60 Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003). 
61 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003). 
62 Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003). 
63 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008). 
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the sentence violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment.  The Court agreed that his sentence constituted cruel 
and unusual punishment and invalidated the Louisiana statute. 
Carr v. United States:64 The Court invalidated a specific provision of 
the federally mandated SORNA legislation that aimed to tighten current sex 
offender registry laws.  It ruled that the Act was retroactively applied to 
offenders, and thus unconstitutionally penalized registrants who moved 
before the law was officially implemented. 
V. THE PRESENT STUDY 
This study examines the following questions: Does the Supreme Court 
refer to theoretical and empirical research when deciding whether sex 
offender laws and policies are constitutional?  Does the Court’s assessment 
of research accord with broader empirical literature on sexual offending and 
policy?  To answer these research questions, we employed the following 
protocol to identify all Court cases involving sex offender laws.  First, a 
search of Lexis-Nexis Lawyers’ Edition was conducted.  Using keywords 
“sex offender,” “sex offenders,” “sex offender laws,” “sex crime laws,” 
“sex crime policy,” “child sexual abuse,” and “child sexual abuse laws,” 
twenty-five potential matches were found.  Thirteen of the cases did not 
focus on sex offender laws.  For example, Blakely v. Washington,65 
identified in the search, did not focus directly on sex offender policy but 
rather on mandatory sentencing guidelines, thereby having no implications 
directly relevant to our study.  Another case, United States v. Juvenile Male, 
although pertaining to juvenile sex offender registration, was also excluded, 
because the Court simply responded to a certified question in a per curiam 
decision.66  Here, then, there was no majority decision to analyze. 
Review of the eleven remaining cases revealed that they centered on 
legislation regulating: civil commitment, virtual or computer-generated 
child pornography, treatment for sex offenders, sex offender community 
notification, sex offender registration, statutes of limitations for sexual 
offenses, and capital punishment for convicted sex offenders.  The Court 
issued only one case per subject area with the exception of civil 
commitment, which garnered four separate decisions—Kansas v. 
Hendricks,67 Seling v. Young,68 Kansas v. Crane,69 and United States v. 
 
64 Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229 (2010). 
65 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
66 United States v. Juvenile Male, 130 S. Ct. 2518 (2010). 
67 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
68 Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001). 
69 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002). 
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Comstock.70  The outcome of these cases was substantively the same—the 
Court upheld the states’ civil commitment statutes in every instance.  At the 
same time, the Court’s rationale across the cases was consistent; the civil 
commitment procedures at issue did not constitute punitive sanctions and 
were therefore legally permissible.  Given this overlap, and because 
Hendricks provided the analytical framework for subsequent cases, it is the 
only civil commitment decision examined.  This approach ensured balance 
in our analyses of the types of sex offender laws addressed by the Court.  In 
the end, the following cases were examined: Hendricks,71 Free Speech 
Coalition,72 McKune,73 Connecticut Department of Public Safety,74 Smith,75 
Stogner,76 Kennedy,77 and Carr.78 
Following the general guidelines for qualitative analysis outlined by 
other scholars,79 we identified virtually any reference to social science 
research in each Court decision.  For the purpose of this study, such 
research was identified using criteria borrowed from Rosemary J. Erickson 
and Rita J. Simon, who operationalized social science data as “information 
dealing with social, social psychological, and psychological issues.”80  
Specifically, we focused on citations within the majority opinions for each 
case from published journal articles, government reports, or public opinion 
polls involving sex crime research.  Acker has cautioned that “[t]he mere 
citation of a social science reference does not, of course, necessarily signify 
that the writer was influenced by the work, nor that it was intended as 
supporting authority for the associated proposition.”81  At the same time, 
however, citations are generally considered “among the best evidence 
available of the judicial reasoning process”82 and are arguably among the 
only visible indicators of the Court’s awareness of research focused on sex 
crimes and offenders. 
 
70 United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010). 
71 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 346. 
72 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
73 McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002). 
74 Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003).  
75 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003). 
76 Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003). 
77 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008). 
78 Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229 (2010). 
79 SHARAN B. MERRIAM, QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: A GUIDE TO DESIGN AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 55, 139  (2d ed. 2009); ANSELM STRAUSS & JULIET CORBIN, BASICS OF 
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING GROUNDED 
THEORY 65, 159, 263  (2d ed. 1998).  
80 See ERICKSON & SIMON, supra note 33, at 2. 
81 See Acker, supra note 26, at 3. 
82 Id. 
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After compiling every instance in which the Court cited social science 
research, we then reviewed the extant literature and contrasted the claims 
made in the majority decisions against those in the cited works and in the 
broader literature on sex crimes, sex offenders, and the impacts of sex 
offender laws.  This approach involved searching academic databases (e.g., 
JSTOR and ProQuest) for relevant scholarship using key terms that 
appeared relevant to each specific claim (for instance, “sex offender 
recidivism” where the Court mentioned a citation about rates of reoffending 
among sex offenders). 
From there, we relied on the qualitative methodology used in prior 
legal research83 to assess the extent to which the Court’s interpretation of 
research accords with the larger state of empirical evidence.  Specifically, 
we relied on a face-validity approach in our analysis: after identifying the 
specific account mentioned by the Court in each decision and reviewing 
relevant scholarship, we considered the preponderance of evidence in 
published scientific reviews and studies. 
VI. FINDINGS 
We begin with the study’s first question—does the Supreme Court 
refer to theory or empirical research on sex crimes when deciding cases 
involving sex offender policies?  Analysis of the Court’s majority opinions 
indicates that the Court indeed references such work.  As inspection of 
Tables 1 through 5 shows, the Court cited a total of 23 scholarly accounts 
across 7 cases, averaging approximately 3.3 citations per case.  The Court 
made no reference to social science in only one opinion—Carr v. United 
States84—a case challenging a provision of SORNA legislation.  This 
estimate accords with findings from other studies.  For example, in an 
analysis of the Supreme Court’s use of social science in criminal justice 
cases decided in the 1958 to 1987 terms, Acker reported that the average 
number of social science citations was 1.3 in his study (n = 240 cases).85  In 
 
83 See generally Deborah W. Denno, The Scientific Shortcomings of Roper v. Simmons, 
3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 379 (2006) (incorporating a similar methodology in an analysis of 
social science research use in a Supreme Court decision involving capital punishment).  See 
also Haney & Logan, supra note 38, at 76 (analyzing references to psychological research in 
Supreme Court cases involving capital punishment); Mark G. Yudof, School Desegregation: 
Legal Realism, Reasoned Elaboration, and Social Science Research in the Supreme Court, 
42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 63 (1978) (analyzing Supreme Court decisions related to 
school desegregation policies).  Here again, Yudof relies on a qualitative approach to 
understand how the Supreme Court references social science research in its decisions.  
84 Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229 (2010). 
85 See Acker, supra note 26, at 10 tbl.3 (decided in the 1958 to 1987 terms).  Acker 
reports 311 citations in 49 opinions (7% of the 700 opinions), and we took 311 and divided it 
by the 240 opinions.  See id. 
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a similar study of the Court’s use of social science research in death penalty 
cases, Acker found approximately eight citations per case (n = 28 cases).86  
The average citations per case here fits squarely within these estimates. 
Our second and more fundamental question is whether the Court’s 
interpretation of the literature accords with findings from a larger body of 
scholarly work.  As we discuss below, we find substantial variation.  Across 
five distinct substantive domains87 in the literature on sex offenders—the 
prevalence of sex crimes; the nature and effects of sex crimes involving 
children; the effectiveness of sex offender treatment; sex offender 
recidivism and reentry; and the effects of sexual victimization—the Court’s 
presentation and interpretation, or the implied meaning, of research findings 
sometimes accords with extant social science studies.  In other instances, 
the findings are overstated or misleading.  A lack of contextual information 
contributes to the misleading nature of some of the discussions—the lack of 
context, for example, typically creates the appearance that a given estimate 
is larger or that a general pattern is clearer than what is indicated by the 
broader body of scholarship on sex offenders.  We turn now to each of these 
five substantive domains and show how the Court’s use of social science 
accords with and, in some cases, departs from assessments in the scholarly 
literature. 
A. SEX CRIME PREVALENCE 
We start with Court references to the prevalence of sex crime (see 
Table 1).  There were two instances in which the Court referred to research 
about the frequency of sex offenses nationally; both occurred in McKune, 
which involved a challenge to an institutional treatment program for sex 
offenders.  First, the Court stated: “In 1995, an estimated 355,000 rapes and 
sexual assaults occurred nationwide.”88  This fact was used in the decision 
in a way that seemingly implied that an unusually large number of these 
offenses occurred in 1995 and that significant increases in sex crimes were 
evident.89  Although the estimate the Court cited was correct, we argue that 
 
86 James R. Acker, A Different Agenda: The Supreme Court, Empirical Research 
Evidence, and Capital Punishment Decisions, 1986-1989, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 65, 72 tbl.1 
(1993) (finding 8.3 citations per case).  
87 Drawing on prior research (e.g., Haney & Logan, supra note 38, at 80) and using a 
face-validity approach advocated by STRAUSS & CORBIN, supra note 79, at 263, we 
constructed these five domains after reviewing the themes of the Court’s findings.  For 
example, there were instances where the Court made mention of research examining the 
prevalence of sex offenses committed against children.  These citations were grouped 
together into one category. 
88 McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 32 (2002). 
89 Id. In our view, the Court’s full quote emphasizes that sex offenders pose an especially 
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the claim lacked context and created a misleading image of both the 
prevalence and trends of sex crimes.  In 1995, there were 1,099,207 
aggravated assaults; 2,593,784 burglaries; 580,509 robberies; and 21,606 
homicides.90  Clearly, the number of sex crimes that occurred in 1995 
compared to the number of other types of crime, with the exception of 
homicides, was relatively low.  In addition, and of more relevance, rapes 
and sexual assaults had been declining in frequency since the early 1990s.91 
 
Table 1 
U.S. Supreme Court References to Research in Sex Offender Cases: Sex 
Crime Prevalence 
Claim Supported? Case	
“In 1995, an estimated 355,000 rapes and sexual assaults 
occurred nationwide.”92	
Correct, but lacks 
context	 McKune	
“Between 1980 and 1994, the population of imprisoned 
sex offenders increased at a faster rate than for any other 
category of violent crime.”93	
Correct, but does 
not imply an 





dangerous threat, beyond that of other offender types, to vulnerable populations:  
Sex offenders are a serious threat in this Nation.  In 1995, an estimated 355,000 rapes and sexual 
assaults occurred nationwide.  Between 1980 and 1994, the population of imprisoned sex 
offenders increased at a faster rate than for any other category of violent crime.  As in the present 
case, the victims of sexual assault are most often juveniles.  In 1995, for instance, a majority of 
reported forcible sexual offenses were committed against persons under 18 years of age.  Id. 
(internal citations omitted). 
In support of our view, see also LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEX OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DATA ON RAPE AND 
SEXUAL ASSAULT 6, 8 fig.8 (1997) (showing a decrease in reports of sex offenses in the 
1990s). 
90 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 
1996: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 64–65 tbl.4 (1997) [hereinafter 1996 UNIFORM CRIME]. 
91 David Finkelhor, Editorial, Improving Research, Policy, and Practice to Understand 
Child Sexual Abuse, 280 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1864, 1864 (1998) (reporting a “dramatic 
decline” in the prevalence of child sexual abuse claims from 1992 to 1997); see also LISA 
JONES & DAVID FINKELHOR, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE DECLINE IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES 2–3 figs.1–4 (2001) (finding 
that a review of abuse allegations indicates a significant decrease nationally in sex offenses 
involving children during the 1990s); Gary LaFree, Declining Violent Crime Rates in the 
1990s: Predicting Crime Booms and Busts, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 145, 147 (1999) (finding that 
rape rates fell by 15.1% from 1991 to 1997). 
92 McKune, 536 U.S. at 32 (citing FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1999: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 24 (2000); Greenfeld, 
supra note 89, at 18).	
93 Id. (citing GREENFELD, supra note 89, at 18).  
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The Court also referred to sex offender incarceration trends: “Between 
1980 and 1994, the population of imprisoned sex offenders increased at a 
faster rate than for any other category of violent crime.”94  This observation 
is correct, but any implication that this increase reflected an increase in sex 
crimes is not.  The explanation that the increase instead resulted from 
tougher sanctioning policies—which would result in more sex offenders 
behind bars even if sex crime rates remained constant—better accords with 
studies showing that sex offending declined during the 1990s.  Indeed, 
federal reports available before the time of the decision document this 
trend.95 
Published research reported on the decline in sex offenses involving 
both children96 and adults.97  For example, in an article in the Journal of the 
American Medical Association published four years prior to the decision, 
David Finkelhor documented that estimates for child sexual victimization 
had declined by 40% since the early 1990s.98  Not least, estimates using 
data from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) showed a 
decrease in the sexual battery victimization rate from 1993 to 2005, 
declining from 2.5 to 0.3 per 1,000 people age 12 and older.99  In short, the 
suggestion in the Court’s decision—that sex crimes were widespread and 
increasing—runs counter to scholarship available at the time of the 
decision.   
 
94 Id. 
95 Put differently, incarceration rates do not necessarily correspond to actual crime rates.  
And so, increased incarceration rates for sex offenders may reflect policy shifts rather than 
actual increases in the extent of sex crime.  See, e.g., JONES & FINKELHOR, supra note 91, at 2–3 
figs.1–4 (relaying that sex offenses dramatically declined across the country during the 1990s). 
96 Finkelhor, supra note 91, at 1864. 
97 LaFree, supra note 91, at 147. 
98 Finkelhor, supra note 91, at 1864 (citing Ching-Tung Wang & Deborah Daro, Current 
Trends in Child Abuse Reporting and Fatalities: The Results of the 1997 Annual Fifty State 
Survey (Ctr. on Child Abuse Prevention Research, Working Paper, 1998)). 
99 Compare SHANNON M. CATALANO, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2005, at 5 tbl.3 (2006), with MICHAEL R. RAND ET AL., 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 1973-95, 
at 3 (1997).  For another report documenting this trend, see CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION 1999: 
CHANGES 1998-99 WITH TRENDS 1993-99, at 1 (2000). 
2013] EVIDENCE OF EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY? 1131 
B. SEX CRIMES INVOLVING CHILDREN 
We turn now to cases in which references to sex crimes involving 
children occurred in Court decisions.  Examination of Table 2 identifies 
seven references to research on such crimes.  In Hendricks, the Court 
observed that pedophilia is “a condition the psychiatric profession itself 
classifies as a serious mental disorder.”100  As reflected by the phrase “the 
psychiatric profession itself,” the Court noted that agreement about this 
claim exists among practitioners, and in so doing, it cited three sources.101  
A review of research, however, indicates that scholars and practitioners 
disagree, as reflected in Linda S. Grossman et al.’s meta-analysis of studies 
published from 1970–1998.102  The authors noted that “[c]linicians have not 
traditionally regarded sex offenders as falling within the target population 
of severely and persistently mentally ill persons considered appropriate for 
civil commitment.”103  The Court acknowledged that some disagreement 
may exist: “We recognize, of course, that psychiatric professionals are not 
in complete harmony in casting pedophilia, or paraphilias in general, as 
‘mental illnesses.’  These disagreements, however, do not tie the State’s 
hands in setting the bounds of its civil commitment laws.”104  In short, the 
Court seemingly generalized a claim beyond what prevailed in empirical 
research and scholarship and appeared to buttress the claim by referencing a 




100 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 (1997). 
101 Id. (citing AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS 525–25, 527–28 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM–IV]; AM. 
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, TREATMENTS OF PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS: A TASK FORCE REPORT OF 
THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION 617–33 (1989) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT]; 
Gene G. Abel & Joanne L. Rouleau, Male Sex Offenders, in HANDBOOK OF OUTPATIENT 
TREATMENT OF ADULTS 271 (Michael E. Thase et al. eds., 1990)). 
102 See Grossman et al., supra note 47, at 359. 
103 Id. 
104 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360 n.3 (internal citation omitted).  Put differently, although 
the Court recognizes that practitioners may disagree, it also acknowledges that when such 
discord exists, “legislative options must be especially broad and courts should be cautious 
not to rewrite legislation.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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Table 2 
U.S. Supreme Court References to Research in Sex Offender Cases: Sex 
Crimes Involving Children 
Claim Supported? Case 
“[Pedophilia is] a condition the psychiatric profession 
itself classifies as a serious mental disorder.” 105 Partially correct Hendricks 
“[T]here are subcultures of persons who harbor illicit 
desires for children and commit criminal acts to gratify 
the impulses.”106 
Partially correct Ashcroft 
“[T]he victims of sexual assault are most often juveniles.  
In 1995, for instance, a majority of reported forcible 
sexual offenses were committed against persons under 18 
years of age.  Nearly 4 in 10 imprisoned violent sex 
offenders said their victims were 12 or younger.”107 
Correct McKune 
“‘[T]he victims of sex assault are most often 
juveniles.’”108 Correct 
Connecticut 
Department of Public 
Safety 
“Empirical research on child molesters, for instance, has 
shown that, ‘[c]ontrary to conventional wisdom, most 
reoffenses do not occur within the first several years after 
release,’ but may occur ‘as late as 20 years following 
release.’”109 
Correct, but lacks 
context Smith 
“Memories fade, and witnesses can die or disappear. . . .  
Such problems can plague child abuse cases, where 
recollection after so many years may be uncertain, and 
‘recovered’ memories faulty, but may nonetheless lead to 
prosecutions that destroy families.”110 
Correct, but 
underreporting of 
such abuse is 
more prevalent 
Stogner 
“Approximately 5,702 incidents of vaginal, anal, or oral 
rape of a child under the age of 12 were reported 
nationwide in 2005; this is almost twice the total 
incidents of intentional murder for victims of all ages 






105 Id. at 360 (citing DSM–IV, supra note 101, at 524–25, 527–28; TASK FORCE REPORT, 
supra note 101, at 617–33; Abel & Rouleau, supra note 101, at 271).  
106 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245 (2002) (describing a congressional 
finding and citing CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U. S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 10 YEARS 
OF REPORTING CHILD MALTREATMENT 1999 (2001)). 
107 McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 32–33 (2002) (citing CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN 
RESEARCH CTR., SEXUAL ABUSE (2000); GREENFELD, supra note 89, at 24, iii). 
108 Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 4 (2003) (quoting McKune, 536 U.S. 
at 32–33).  
109 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 104 (2003) (quoting ROBERT A. PRENTKY ET AL., NAT’L 
INST. OF JUSTICE, CHILD SEXUAL MOLESTATION: RESEARCH ISSUES 14 (1997)). 
110 Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 631 (2003) (citing Lynn Holdsworth, Is It 
Repressed Memory with Delayed Recall or Is It False Memory Syndrome? The Controversy 
and Its Potential Legal Implications, 22 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 103, 103–04 (1998)). 
111 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 438 (2008) (citing FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL INCIDENT-BASED REPORTING SYSTEM, 
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The next reference to sex crime research involved a discussion of child 
pornography in Ashcroft.  In this case, the Court relied on legislative 
findings in which Congress had recognized that “there are subcultures of 
persons who harbor illicit desires for children and commit criminal acts to 
gratify the impulses.”112  Such an assessment may best be characterized as 
partially accurate.  The first part of the assertion is supported by prior 
research.  For example, Philip Jenkins identified certain enclaves of 
individuals (“child porn enthusiasts”) who visit child pornography websites, 
download pornographic images of children, and participate in child 
pornography message boards.113  However, the second part of the 
statement—that such individuals “commit criminal acts to gratify the 
impulses”—is only questionably supported.  At the time of the decision, no 
research had examined whether an association exists between viewing child 
pornography and committing child sex offenses and whether such an 
association, should it have existed, was causal.114   
The Court made the third claim in McKune.  Here, with a focus on 
child sex victimization, the Court stated, “[T]he victims of sexual assault 
are most often juveniles.  In 1995, for instance, a majority of reported 
forcible offenses were committed against persons under 18 years of age.  
Nearly 4 in 10 imprisoned violent sex offenders said their victims were 12 
 
2005, Study No. 4720 (2005)). 
112 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245 (2002) (citing CHILDREN’S 
BUREAU, supra note 106). 
113 See JENKINS, supra note 50, at 102. 
114 Since the Ashcroft decision, research has examined whether child pornography 
offenders are more likely to commit contact sex offenses.  For example, in 2009, a study 
conducted by Michael L. Bourke and Andres E. Hernandez found that offenders with a prior 
child pornography offense were “significantly more likely than not” to have committed a 
“hands-on” sex offense.  Michael L. Bourke & Andres E. Hernandez, The ‘Butner Study’ 
Redux: A Report of the Incidence of Hands-On Child Victimization by Child Pornography 
Offenders, 24 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 183, 188 (2009).  However, the authors cautioned that it would 
be “presumptuous” to attribute a causal relationship between child pornography viewing and 
contact sexual offending.  Id. at 189.  Indeed, the majority of offenders in the study reported 
viewing child pornography only after having committed a contact sex offense (e.g., child 
molestation).  Id.; see also, Michael C. Seto et al., Contact Sexual Offending by Men with 
Online Sexual Offenses, 23 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 124, 136 (2011) (reporting 
that  little evidence exists suggesting a causal link between viewing child pornography and 
actual hands-on, offending and “[a]lthough there is considerable overlap between online and 
offline offending, our results suggest there is a distinct group of online offenders whose only 
sexual crimes involve illegal (most often child) pornography”).  Of primary relevance here is 
that at the time of the Ashcroft decision, no published studies had identified an association 
between viewing child pornography and engaging in sexual offending.  See generally Bourke 
& Hernandez, supra, at 185 (stating that their 2009 article is one of the first to test for a 
correlation between child pornography use and contact offending).  
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or younger.”115  The Court also expressed this finding in Connecticut, 
noting that “victims of sex assault are most often juveniles.”116  Extant 
research supports both claims.  From 1991 to 1996, the period overlapping 
with those referred to in these cases, 67% of all victims of sexual assaults 
reported to law enforcement were juveniles (under the age of 18) and more 
than half of all juvenile victims were under age 12.117 
In a different case, Smith, the Court discussed research about child 
molesters.  Quoting a study, the Court reasoned, “‘[c]ontrary to 
conventional wisdom, most reoffenses do not occur within the first several 
years after release,’ but may occur ‘as late as 20 years following 
release.’”118  Again, the Court’s assessment accords with the larger body of 
sex offender research.  Child molesters have lifetime reoffense rates that 
range from approximately 50%119 to 70%,120 compared to less than 20% for 
sex offenders as a group.121  Studies also suggest that child molesters are at 
risk of reoffending many years after their first arrests.  For example, R. Karl 
Hanson and colleagues reported in their study of child molesters that 42% 
were eventually reconvicted, “with 23% of the recidivists being reconvicted 
more than 10 years after they were released.”122 
Notwithstanding the accurate summary of research, the Court’s 
decision then advanced an argument that ran counter to what is implied by 
scholarship on sex offenders.  The Court emphasized that child molesters 
have high rates of lifetime recidivism, and thus “[t]he duration of the 
reporting requirements [of the Alaska registry] is not excessive.”123  
However, child molesters represent only one type of sex offender while 
Alaska’s sex offender registry applies to a wide range of sex offenders, not 
just those who engaged in child molestation.  Such a distinction clearly 
 
115 McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 32–33 (2002) (citing CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN 
RESEARCH CTR., supra note 107; GREENFELD, supra note 89, at 24, iii). 
116 Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 4 (2003) (quoting McKune, 536 U.S. 
at 32). 
117 HOWARD N. SNYDER, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL 
ASSAULT OF YOUNG CHILDREN AS REPORTED TO LAW ENFORCEMENT: VICTIM, INCIDENT, AND 
OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS 2 (2000). 
118 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 104 (2002) (quoting PRENTKY ET AL., supra note 109, at 14). 
119 See Doren, supra note 46, at 101. 
120 Ron Langevin et al., Lifetime Sex Offender Recidivism: A 25-Year Follow-Up Study, 
46 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 531, 545 (2004). 
121 Don Grubin & Sarah Wingate, Sexual Offence Recidivism: Prediction Versus 
Understanding, 6 CRIM. BEHAV. & MENTAL HEALTH 349, 350 (1996); see also KAREN J. 
TERRY, SEXUAL OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 36 (2005). 
122 R. Karl Hanson et al., Long-Term Recidivism of Child Molesters, 61 J. CONSULTING & 
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 646, 650 (1993). 
123 Smith, 538 U.S. at 104. 
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exists in scholarship on sex offenders.  If the Court had recognized the 
distinction and followed the same logic of the decision, it would have held 
reporting requirements to be excessive for other types of sex offenders 
whose victims were not children.  In short, two critical contexts were 
omitted—child molesters are not representative of all sex offenders, and the 
sex offender registry affected all sex offenders, not just child molesters. 
In Stogner, a case challenging a state law that permitted prosecutors to 
bring sexual abuse charges against individuals even if the statutes of 
limitations for those crimes have expired, the Court stated: “Memories fade, 
and witnesses can die or disappear.  Such problems can plague child abuse 
cases, where recollection after so many years may be uncertain, and 
‘recovered’ memories faulty, but may nonetheless lead to prosecutions that 
destroy families.”124  For the latter proposition, the Court cited research 
questioning the reliability of child sexual abuse recollections.  The Court 
intimates that distorted memories in the form of “false memory syndrome” 
could potentially lead to false allegations of sex crimes.  Its citation, while 
generally discussing the issue at hand, does not provide an estimate of the 
extent to which faulty memories result in false allegations of sex offenses.  
To the contrary, little empirical justification exists to support the argument 
that faulty memory syndrome significantly contributes to false allegations 
of sex offenses.  Under this logic, Stephanie J. Dallam’s observation in a 
review (available at the time of the decision) is instructive: 
False memory advocates have failed to adequately define or document the existence 
of a specific syndrome, and a review of the relevant literature demonstrates that the 
construct is based on a series of faulty assumptions, many of which have been 
disproven.  Likewise, there are no credible data showing that the vague symptoms 
they ascribe to this purported syndrome are widespread or constitute a crisis or 
epidemic.125  
More generally, prior scholarship indicates the opposite concern.  
Specifically, U.S. child sexual abuse is most likely underreported.126  
Societal responses towards victims, often called “blaming the victim,” can 
lead them to be unwilling to report sex offenders.127  Thus, while faulty 
memory clearly can affect the accuracy of some individuals’ recollections, a 
more likely situation appears to be one in which individuals do not report 
 
124 Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 631 (2003) (citing Holdsworth, supra note 110, 
at 103–04). 
125 Stephanie J. Dallam, Crisis or Creation? A Systematic Examination of “False 
Memory Syndrome,” 9 J. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 9, 30 (2002). 
126 TERRY, supra note 121, at 9–10. 
127 See, e.g., Cathy Spatz Widom & Suzanne Morris, Accuracy of Adult Recollections of 
Childhood Victimization: Part 2.  Childhood Sexual Abuse, 9 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 34, 35, 42 
(1997) (discussing social pressures against reporting as experienced by males in particular).  
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victimization.  Accordingly, no empirical evidence supports the claim that 
falsified reporting and the resulting bogus allegations would present greater 
problems than underreporting. 
 Finally, in Kennedy, the Court relied on National Incident-Based 
Reporting System (NIBRS) data in stating, “Approximately 5,702 incidents 
of vaginal, anal, or oral rape of a child under the age of 12 were reported 
nationwide in 2005; this is almost twice the total incidents of intentional 
murder for victims of all ages (3,405) reported during the same period.”128  
The Court’s concern in this case, in part, was that efforts to permit the death 
penalty for child rapists would substantially increase the number of capital-
punishment-eligible cases.  Here, the Court’s use of NIBRS-based estimates 
accurately reflected published accounts, but it neglected to note that these 
estimates understate true crime—many sex crimes are not reported,129 and 
many law enforcement agencies do not participate in NIBRS.  Accordingly, 
the statistics represent a conservative estimate of sex crime nationally, and 
child sexual abuse is likely more prevalent.130  
C. SEX OFFENDER TREATMENT 
 The Court made three observations about research in examining the 
efficacy of sex offender treatment; all three appeared in McKune (see Table 
3).  First, the Court reported, “Therapists and correctional officers widely 
agree that clinical rehabilitative programs can enable sex offenders to 
manage their impulses and in this way reduce recidivism.”131  A review of 
research suggests, however, that practitioners in fact do not widely agree 
that rehabilitative programs can help offenders control impulses and reduce 
recidivism.  In a summary preceding her study, for example, Janice K. 
Marques emphasized that “[d]espite the efforts of many talented clinicians 
through the past several decades, the question of whether sex offender 
 
128 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 438 (2008) (citing FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, supra note 111). 
129 Ronet Bachman, The Factors Related to Rape Reporting Behavior and Arrest: New 
Evidence from the National Crime Victimization Survey, 25 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 8, 25 (1998).  
130 See generally DAVID FINKELHOR & RICHARD ORMROD, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & 
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: PATTERNS FROM 
NIBRS 2 (2004) (discussing the limitations of NIBRS in measuring sex crime); JUSTICE 
RESEARCH & STATISTICS ASS’N, STATUS OF NIBRS IN THE STATES (2012) (noting that as of 
June 2012, approximately 29% of the population was covered by NIBRS data); Michael G. 
Maxfield, The National Incident-Based Reporting System: Research and Policy 
Applications, 15 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 119, 133 (1999) (highlighting the 
shortcomings of NIBRS in providing accurate estimates of crime nationally). 
131 McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 33 (2002) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. 
OF CORRS., A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO TREATING THE INCARCERATED MALE SEX OFFENDER 
xiii (Barbara K. Schwartz ed., 1988)). 
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treatment works is still hotly debated.”132  In a later review, Karen J. Terry 
found that “results of sex offender treatment programs are conflicting and 
researchers are largely divided as to the benefits of treatment.”133  Similarly, 
Hanson et al. in a meta-analysis of sex offender treatment programs noted 
that “[d]espite more than 35 review papers since 1990, and a review of 
reviews, researchers and policy-makers have yet to agree on whether 
treatment effectively reduces sexual recidivism.”134   
 Actual empirical investigations available at the time of the decision 
also cast doubt on the Court’s claim.  For instance, Vernon L. Quinsey and 
Anne Maguire examined interclinician agreement on the recommended type 
of treatment for male offenders remanded for psychiatric evaluation (n = 
200 cases; 21 included sex offenders).135  Their findings indicated that 
“there is no consensus among clinicians even after a case has been 
discussed as to whether any particular treatment [other than drugs used to 
control mental disorders] is relevant for a particular remand or as to how 
much [an offender] might benefit from a particular treatment.”136   
 Other work has focused on examining correctional staffs’ views of 
offender treatment.  To illustrate, a study published seven years prior to 
McKune found that correctional officers (n = 82) who supervised sex 
offenders were significantly less convinced that they could be treated as 
well as non-sex offenders (79.3% of officers were doubtful about treatment 
effects for sex offenders versus 47.6% for other offender types; p < 0.05).137   
 Collectively, these findings suggest the Court’s claim about 
practitioner views138 is not empirically supported.  A more problematic 
 
132 Janice K. Marques, How to Answer the Question: “Does Sex Offender Treatment 
Work?,” 14 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 437, 437 (1999). 
133 TERRY, supra note 121, at 139.  
134 R. Karl Hanson et al., First Report of the Collaborative Outcome Data Project on the 
Effectiveness of Psychological Treatment for Sex Offenders, 14 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & 
TREATMENT 169, 170 (2002) (internal citation omitted). 
135 Vernon L. Quinsey & Anne Maguire, Offenders Remanded for a Psychiatric 
Examination: Perceived Treatability and Disposition, 6 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 193, 194–
95 (1983). 
136 Id. at 204.  Disagreement also exists among researchers.  Compare Vernon L.  
Quinsey et al., Assessing Treatment Efficacy in Outcome Studies of Sex Offenders, 8 J. 
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 512, 521 (1993) (arguing that the literature does not support the 
assumption that psychological and hormonal treatment are effective for reducing sexual 
recidivism), with W. L. Marshall & W. D. Pithers, A Reconsideration of Treatment Outcome 
with Sex Offenders, 21 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 10, 23 (1994) (claiming, based on their 
analysis of extant studies, that research supports treatment as an effective policy to reduce 
recidivism since “at the very least some sex offenders respond effectively to treatment”). 
137 John R. Weekes et al., Correctional Officers: How Do They Perceive Sex Offenders?, 
39 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 55, 57–59 (1995). 
138 McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 33 (2002) (“Therapists and correctional officers widely 
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assertion exists in the Court’s logic, however.  The Court equated 
practitioner beliefs with findings from actual impact evaluations, which 
indicate that a given policy or program is effective.139  The belief that 
scientific evidence would flow from practitioner endorsement of a practice 
or program is questionable—as recognized by Todd Edmund Hogue: 
“although [practitioners are] happy with the programme . . . [it may be that] 
the treatment program is, itself, ineffective.”140  Stated differently, therapist 
and correctional officers’ views might be considered “expert” opinions, but 
they are not evidence of effective policy. 
 
Table 3 
U.S. Supreme Court References to Research in Sex Offender Cases: Sex 
Offender Treatment 
Claim Supported? Case	
“Therapists and correctional officers widely agree that 
clinical rehabilitative programs can enable sex offenders 









“‘[T]he rate of recidivism of treated sex offenders is 
fairly consistently estimated to be around 15%,’ whereas 
the rate of recidivism of untreated offenders has been 
estimated to be as high as 80%.”142	
Correct, but 
overstated	 McKune	
“‘Denial is generally regarded as a main impediment to 
successful therapy,’ and ‘[t]herapists depend on 
offenders’ truthful descriptions of events leading to past 
offences in order to determine which behaviours need to 
be targeted in therapy.’”143	 Correct, but overstated	 McKune	“Research indicates that offenders who deny all 
allegations of sexual abuse are three times more likely to 





agree that clinical rehabilitative programs can enable sex offenders to manage their impulses 
and in this way reduce recidivism.”). 
139 Id. (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 131, at xiii).  
140 Todd Edmund Hogue, Training Multi-Disciplinary Teams to Work with Sex 
Offenders: Effects on Staff Attitudes, 1 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 227, 234 (1995). 
141 McKune, 536 U.S. at 33 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 131, at xiii). 
142 Id. (parenthetically quoting U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 131, at xiii). 
143 Id. (quoting Howard E. Barbaree, Denial and Minimization Among Sex Offenders: 
Assessment and Treatment Outcome, 3 F. ON CORRECTIONS RES. 30 (1991)). 
144 Id. (citing BARRY M. MALETZKY WITH KEVIN B. MCGOVERN, TREATING THE SEXUAL 
OFFENDER 253–55 (1991)). 
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In McKune, the Court also quoted evidence to state: “‘[T]he rate of 
recidivism of treated sex offenders is fairly consistently estimated to be 
around 15 percent,’ whereas the rate of recidivism of untreated offenders 
has been estimated to be as high as 80%.”145  The Court here is technically 
correct—some studies suggest that treatment can effectively reduce 
recidivism.  However, the assertion is misleading in that it does not draw 
attention to the fact that many treatment programs have been found to be 
ineffective; some may increase recidivism; and treatment effectiveness can 
otherwise vary greatly depending on the type of intervention and the type of 
sex offenders.146  To illustrate, Friedrich Lösel and Martin Schmucker used 
meta-analysis to examine results from extant sex offender treatment studies 
(n = 69).147  They identified seven separate categories of treatment (e.g., 
“hormonal medication,” “cognitive-behavioral,” “insight-oriented,” 
“therapeutic community”).148  Organic treatments (such as surgical 
castration and hormonal medication) showed the most promise in reducing 
sexual recidivism.149  Under the psychosocial treatment category, cognitive 
behavioral therapy was the most effective intervention.150  By contrast, the 
four other treatment methods were significantly less effective.151  More 
relevant was the fact that other studies—available at the time of the 
decision—reported a similar pattern of treatment effects.152  In a decision 
focused on sex offender treatment, the Court thus notably reported an 
accurate finding, but it did so in a way that obscured the equally true 
finding that many treatment programs are ineffective. 
 The Court’s decision went further and asserted: “‘Denial is generally 
regarded as a main impediment to successful therapy,’ and ‘[t]herapists 
depend on offenders’ truthful descriptions of events leading to past offences 
in order to determine which behaviours need to be targeted in therapy.’”153  
In addition, the Court stated, “Research indicates that offenders who deny 
all allegations of sexual abuse are three times more likely to fail in 
 
145 Id. (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 131, at xiii). 
146 See Vernon L. Quinsey et al., A Retrospective Evaluation of the Regional Treatment 
Centre Sex Offender Treatment Program, 13 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 621, 640 (1998); 
see also TERRY, supra note 121, at 163. 
147 Friedrich Lösel & Martin Schmucker, The Effectiveness of Treatment for Sexual 
Offenders: A Comprehensive Meta-Analysis, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 117, 121 (2005). 




152 Catherine A. Gallagher et al., A Quantitative Review of the Effects of Sex Offender 
Treatment on Sexual Reoffending, 3 CORRECTIONS MGMT. Q. 19, 27 (1999). 
153 McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 33 (2002) (quoting Barbaree, supra note 143, at 30). 
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treatment than those who admit even partial complicity.”154  The claim, 
therefore, is that denial contributes strongly to sex offending and should be 
targeted in treatment.  However, reviews of the empirical literature indicate 
that “research is inconclusive about the linkage between denial and 
recidivism.”155  Indeed, some studies have found no statistically significant 
relationship between denial and subsequent sex offending.156  Denial thus 
may contribute to sex offending and targeting denial may increase treatment 
effectiveness, but the literature to date provides no clear grounds from 
which to claim that these possibilities are supported empirically. 
D. SEX OFFENDER RECIDIVISM AND REENTRY 
Another prominent and related focus in scholarship on sex offenders 
centers around prisoner reentry and recidivism.  As shown in Table 4, there 
are five references to this theme in the Court’s decisions.  In both McKune 
and Connecticut, the Court reported, “When convicted sex offenders reenter 
society, they are much more likely than any other type of offender to be 
rearrested for a new rape or sex assault.”157  This claim is technically 
correct, but it also is misleading.  Studies—notably, several available at the 
time of these decisions—consistently find that sex offenders as a group 
have low rates of recidivism.158  Although the rates of recidivism for sex 
offenses are relatively low,159 they are higher than the rates for individuals 
convicted for non-sex offenses.160  Lisa L. Sample and Timothy M. Bray’s 
 
154 Id. (citing MALETZKY WITH MCGOVERN, supra note 144, at 253–55).  
155 Jill S. Levenson & Mark J. Macgowan, Engagement, Denial, and Treatment Progress 
Among Sex Offenders in Group Therapy, 16 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 49, 52 (2004). 
156 See, e.g., R. Karl Hanson & Monique T. Bussière, Predicting Relapse: A Meta-
Analysis of Sexual Offender Recidivism Studies, 66 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 
348, 357 (1998). 
157 McKune, 536 U.S. at 33 (citing ALLEN J. BECK & BERNARD E. SHIPLEY, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983, at 
6 (1997); GREENFELD, supra note 89, at 27); see also Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 
U.S. 1, 4 (2003) (quoting McKune, 536 U.S. at 33). 
158 CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT., RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS 6 (2001) (discussing 
research finding low base rates for sex offenses); Hanson & Bussière, supra note 156, at 357 
(reporting that their meta-analytic findings “contradict the popular view that sexual offenders 
inevitably reoffend,” and that “a minority of the total sample (13.4% of 23,393) were known 
to have committed a new sexual offense within the average 4- to 5-year follow-up period”). 
159 LEAM A. CRAIG ET AL., ASSESSING RISK IN SEX OFFENDERS: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 
41 (2008) (explaining that as a group, sex offenders have low reoffense rates and citing two 
studies that found base rates ranging from 3% to 6%). 
160 PATRICK A. LANGAN ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994, at 1 (2003) (finding that, compared 
to offenders with no prior sex crime convictions, offenders with prior sex offense convictions were 
four times more likely to be rearrested over a three-year period for another sex offense).  
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study of offender recidivism in Illinois (n = 146, 918) is illustrative—6.5% 
of sex offenders were rearrested for a new sex crime.161  Other types of 
offenders also were rearrested for sex crimes, but the percentages were 
lower, leading the authors to conclude “that the overwhelming majority of 
offenders in all listed crime categories were not rearrested for a sex crime, 
including those persons classified as sex offenders.”162  When relative rates 
of sex offender recidivism are compared to the rates of sex crimes 
committed by other prior offenders (e.g., 6.5% vs. 2.5%),163 it thus can 
appear that convicted sex offenders are two or three times more likely to 
recidivate for a sex crime. 
  
 
161 Lisa L. Sample & Timothy M. Bray, Are Sex Offenders Dangerous?, 3 CRIMINOLOGY 
& PUB. POL’Y 59, 74, 76 (2003). 
162 Id. at 74; see also Alex R. Piquero et al., Sex Offenders and Sex Offending in the 
Cambridge Study in Delinquent Development: Prevalence, Frequency, Specialization, 
Recidivism, and (Dis)Continuity over the Life-Course, 35 J. CRIME & JUST. 412, 421 (2012) 
(“Not only did we find sex offenders and sex offending to be very rare . . . , but there was no 
continuity in sex offending between the juvenile (>17) and adult (18–50) periods and very 
few sex recidivists (3/10).  These results call into question the view that sex offenders are a 
highly chronic, specialist, recidivistic group of offenders.”). 
163 Sample & Bray, supra note 161, at 74 (finding that among those previously convicted 
of robbery, kidnapping, and stalking, for example, the average percentage of rearrests for sex 
crimes fell between 2% and 3%).  Thus, while the percentage of rearrests that represent sex 
crimes among the general offender population is somewhat lower than the percentage of 
rearrests that represent sex crimes among the sex offender population, the numbers are 
relatively close.  
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Table 4 
U.S. Supreme Court References to Research in Sex Offender Cases: Sex 
Offender Recidivism and Reentry 
Claim Supported? Case	
“‘[W]hen convicted sex offenders reenter society, they 
are much more likely than any other type of offender to 






“Alaska could conclude that a conviction for a sex 




“The legislature’s findings are consistent with grave 
concerns over the high rate of recidivism among 
convicted sex offenders and their dangerousness as a 
class.  The risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders is 
‘frightening and high.’”166	
Incorrect	 Smith	
“‘[T]he procedures employed under the Alaska statute 
are likely to make [respondents] completely 
unemployable’ because ‘employers will not want to risk 
loss of business when the public learns that they have 
hired sex offenders.’  This [statement from the Court of 
Appeals] is conjecture.”167	
Incorrect	 Smith	
“Given the general mobility of our population, for 
Alaska to make its registry system available and easily 
accessible throughout the State was not so excessive a 
regulatory requirement as to become a punishment.”168 
Correct, but 
lacks context Smith 
 
 
164 Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 4 (2003) (quoting McKune v. Lile, 
536 U.S. 24, 33 (2002)).  For the original proposition, McKune cited BECK & SHIPLEY, supra 
note 157, at 6 and GREENFELD, supra note 89, at 27. 
165 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2002). 
166 Id. (citing McKune, 536 U.S. at 33, 34). 
167 Id. at 100 (quoting Doe I v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)).  Earlier in the 
Court’s opinion, it discussed the historical functions of punishment.  Id. at 97–98 (citing 
THOMAS G. BLOMBERG & KAROL LUCKEN, AMERICAN PENOLOGY: A HISTORY OF CONTROL 
30–31 (2000); ALICE MORSE EARLE, CURIOUS PUNISHMENTS OF BYGONE DAYS 1–2 (1896); 
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 38, 40 (1993); 
RAPHAEL SEMMES, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN EARLY MARYLAND 35 (1938); Adam J. 
Hirsch, From Pillory to Penitentiary: The Rise of Criminal Incarceration in Early 
Massachusetts, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1179, 1226, 1228 (1982); Toni M. Massaro, Shame, 
Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1913 (1991)).  Seemingly 
drawing a distinction between registries and historical sanctions intended to shame and 
ostracize offenders, the Court then stated that “any initial resemblance [of registries] to prior 
punishments is, however, misleading.”  Id. at 98. 
168 Id. at 105 (citing DONNA D. SCHRAM & CHERYL DARLING MILLOY, WASH. STATE 
INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION: A STUDY OF OFFENDER 
CHARACTERISTICS AND RECIDIVISM 13 (1995)). 
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The Court adhered to similar reasoning in Smith: “Alaska could 
conclude that a conviction for a sex offense provides evidence of substantial 
risk of recidivism.”169  The question here is what constitutes “substantial.”  
The literature documents that a conviction for a sex crime is associated with 
an increased likelihood of a subsequent sex crime arrest.  It does not 
document the magnitude of this effect, what produces it (e.g., actual 
offending versus a greater likelihood of supervision of convicted sex 
offenders), or its magnitude relative to that of other risk factors.170  At the 
same time, extant research has identified that dynamic risk factors—that is, 
factors that, unlike static factors (e.g., age, prior offense), can change (e.g., 
attitudes)—can greatly increase predictive accuracy.171  Not least, research 
has found that recidivism rates vary greatly among types of sex offenders, 
with child molesters evidencing a substantially greater likelihood of 
offending.172  Also, as noted above, studies typically show that base rates of 
sex offender recidivism for sex crimes are typically so low as to require 
large samples and longer follow-up periods to conduct robust assessments 
of recidivism risk.173 
Elsewhere in Smith, the Court went beyond failing to provide context 
and asserted claims that simply were incorrect.  The Court stated: “The 
legislature’s findings are consistent with grave concerns over the high rate 
of recidivism among convicted sex offenders and their dangerousness as a 
class.  The risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders is ‘frightening and 
high.’”174  The Court then referred to two citations that it had used 
previously in McKune.175  One citation provides some support for the 
Court’s assertion that a sex offender’s overall odds of being rearrested for a 
sex offense is greater than a non-sex offender’s odds.176  Even so, the 
Court’s citation buttresses an earlier point evident in the Sample and Bray 
study177—namely that sexual recidivism is a rare phenomenon as nearly 
 
169 Id. at 103. 
170 See Hanson & Bussière, supra note 156, at 357 (finding in a meta-analysis that prior 
sex offense conviction history is one factor among many—“criminal lifestyle,” “deviant 
sexual interests”—that predict recidivism). 
171 See id. at 358; R. Karl Hanson et al., Sexual Offender Recidivism Risk: What We 
Know and What We Need to Know, in SEXUALLY COERCIVE BEHAVIOR: UNDERSTANDING 
AND MANAGEMENT 154, 162–63 (Robert A. Prentky et al. eds., 2003).  
172 See Doren, supra note 46, at 101; see also ANDREW J. R. HARRIS & R. KARL HANSON, 
PUB. SAFETY & EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CAN., SEX OFFENDER RECIDIVISM: A SIMPLE 
QUESTION, USER REPORT 1(2004).  
173 Doren, supra note 46, at 98. 
174 Smith, 538 U.S. at 103 (quoting McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34 (2002)). 
175 Id. (quoting McKune, 536 U.S. at 34). 
176 BECK & SHIPLEY, supra note 157, at 6.  
177 Sample & Bray, supra note 161, at 76.  
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92% of released sex offenders in the Allen J. Beck and Bernard E. Shipley 
study did not go on to commit other sex offenses.178  The other citation also 
indicates a decline in sex offense reports nationally during the 1990s179—a 
point the Court appears to miss.   
More specifically, the Court relied on data from precedent and ignored 
findings from numerous other sources that were available at the time of the 
decision, including the federally funded Center for Sex Offender 
Management.  The Center found that sex offenders, compared to other types 
of offenders, have lower levels of general recidivism and lower-than-
assumed levels of sex recidivism; additionally, it concluded that such 
reoffending is relatively rare.180  As one example, in an analysis of 
Canadian sex offenders, Andrew J. R. Harris and R. Karl Hanson found that 
after fifteen years, 73% of sex offenders had not been charged with or 
convicted of another sex offense.181  Their study findings echo results from 
R. Karl Hanson and Monique T. Bussière’s earlier quantitative review of 
recidivism studies, which found an average recidivism rate of 13.4% after a 
follow-up period of four to five years.182  A similar study conducted by 
Patrick A. Langan et al. of U.S. sex offenders found a recidivism rate 
(measured by criminal conviction) of 5.3% after three years.183  As noted 
above, the relative risk of sex offending is higher for sex offenders than for 
other types of offenders,184 but the absolute risk is low.185 
 
178 See BECK & SHIPLEY, supra note 157, at 6. 
179 See GREENFELD, supra note 89, at 1.  
180 Myths and Facts About Sex Offenders, CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT. (Aug. 2000), 
http://www.csom.org/pubs/mythsfacts.html.  
181 HARRIS & HANSON, supra note 172, at 11. 
182 Hanson & Bussière, supra note 156, at 351.  
183 LANGAN ET AL., supra note 160, at 1.  
184 Sample & Bray, supra note 161, at 74. 
185 It should be emphasized that studies have measured the cost of sexual offending to 
society.  For example, Matt DeLisi et al. calculated the monetary costs of various types of 
offenses—homicide, rape, armed robbery, aggravated assault, and burglary.  Matt DeLisi et 
al., Murder by Numbers: Monetary Costs Imposed by a Sample of Homicide Offenders, 21 J. 
FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 501, 507 (2009).  Results indicated that rape constituted 
the second most costly crime (after homicide).  Id.  Notably, the third most costly offense—
armed robbery—imposed similar costs on the victim as rape would but had a higher cost to 
the justice system.  Id.  Although the study focused on the actual costs of rape offenses, it did 
not calculate costs for non-sexual intercourse crimes (e.g., lewd and lascivious acts, child 
pornography crimes).  Thus, the extent to which these costs are comparable to other sex 
offenses is questionable, as substantial heterogeneity exists in sexual offending.  This study 
was not available at the time of the Smith decision.  The Court then had little clear empirical 
basis on which to argue that the risk of recidivism, and by extension the costs, posed by sex 
offenders was “frightening and high.” 
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In Smith, the Court considered whether a registry law constituted ex 
post facto punishment, and it held that a lack of empirical evidence existed 
to support the claim that the law decreased employment prospects for 
released sex offenders.186  Early in the opinion, the Court cited literature 
centered on understanding the effects of punishment.187  The Court noted, 
for instance, that sanctions (such as public whippings, branding) were 
historically designed to ensure “offenders suffer[ed] ‘permanent stigmas, 
which in effect cast the person out of the community.’”188  However, the 
Court drew a distinction between these types of historical sanctions and sex 
offender registries: the former was intended  to inflict physical harm and 
foment public confrontation; the latter’s goal is to disseminate accurate 
information about the offender.189  On the basis of this distinction, the Court 
dismissed as “conjecture” the lower court’s reliance  on the criticism that 
registries have the potential to affect offenders’ employment prospects.190  
Specifically, the Court viewed as unsupported the claim that the Alaska 
statute would make offenders completely unemployable—or, at the least, 
more unemployable—than would have occurred without the registry.  
However, the Court’s rebuke did not comport with the then-published social 
scientific research findings that supported the lower court’s reasoning. 
Research had indicated that registered sex offenders do face significant 
additional employment discrimination relative to other offenders.191  All 
 
186 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 100 (2003). 
187 Id. at 97–98. 
188 Id. at 98 (citations omitted) (quoting Massaro, supra note 167, at 1913 and citing others). 
189 See id. at 98–99. 
190 Id. at 100 (citation omitted).  The Court further noted:  
Landlords and employers could conduct background checks on the criminal records of 
prospective employees or tenants even with the Act not in force.  The record in this case contains 
no evidence that the Act has led to substantial occupational or housing disadvantages for former 
sex offenders that would not have otherwise occurred through the use of routine background 
checks by employers and landlords.  Id. 
191 Richard G. Zevitz & Mary Ann Farkas, Sex Offender Community Notification: 
Managing High Risk Criminals or Exacting Further Vengeance?, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 375, 381 
(2000)  (finding nearly 60% of offenders reported employment loss due to registrant status); see 
also William Edwards & Christopher Hensley, Contextualizing Sex Offender Management 
Legislation and Policy: Evaluating the Problem of Latent Consequences in Community 
Notification Laws, 45 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 83, 89  (2001) 
(identifying employment discrimination as a barrier to reentry for registered sex offenders, 
stating that while “it is vital for the released offender to reintegrate into a given community in a 
way that allows him or her to find employment and form positive adult supportive 
relationships, the intense stigma and shame surrounding the [registered] offender’s prior 
behavior as well as the ever-present label of sex offender make these crucial adjustments 
extremely difficult and stressful as things stand now”); Wayne A. Logan, Sex Offender 
Registration and Community Notification: Emerging Legal and Research Issues, 989 ANNALS 
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criminal convictions are a matter of public record and thus have the 
potential to induce collateral consequences such as reduced employment.    
Per the extant scholarship available at the time of the decision,192 and per 
Richard Tewksbury and Matthew Lees, registration “may promote unique 
and/or especially burdensome consequences and reentry challenges.”193  In 
short, then, according to scholarship available at the time of the decision, 
registries introduce additional collateral consequences for registrants 
compared to non-sex felony offenders who are not mandated to register.  
Although specific empirical research documenting such an effect in Alaska 
did not exist at the time of the decision, scholarship identifying additional 
barriers to employment imposed by registries was available.  From this 
latter perspective, there was no conjecture.  Rather, the Ninth Circuit was 
relying on an assumption supported by social scientific research; by 
contrast, the Supreme Court appears to have ignored such work and, in so 
doing, could claim that the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning was conjecture.   
Finally, the Court observed, “Given the general mobility of our 
population, for Alaska to make its registry system available and easily 
accessible throughout the State was not so excessive a regulatory 
requirement as to become a punishment.”194  As support for this assertion, 
the Court advised readers to see Donna D. Schram and Cheryl Darling 
Milloy’s study on community notification, which found that 38% of sex 
offense recidivism events in Washington State took place in jurisdictions 
other than where the offenders previously committed the offenses.195  This 
citation was offered as support to buttress the belief that a substantial 
proportion of sex offenders recidivate outside of the location where they 
initially offended.  It derived, however, from one study focused on 
Washington’s community notification law, not the Alaska registry 
requirement.  This context was not provided nor was any information 
described about the cross-jurisdictional recidivism of individuals convicted 
of a wide range of other crimes.  The latter information would have clarified 
the Court’s understanding of the extent to which such a pattern was unique 
to sex offending or common to a range of offenses and offenders. 
 
N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 337, 343–44 (2003) (highlighting scholarship showing employment 
discrimination occurs among registrants).  Other work emphasizes general reentry issues, 
which are likely compounded by registrant status.   See, e.g., JEREMY TRAVIS ET AL., FROM 
PRISON TO HOME: THE DIMENSIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF PRISONER REENTRY 31–32 (2001) 
(identifying employment challenges as a significant barrier to successful reentry). 
192 See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
193 Richard Tewksbury & Matthew Lees, Perceptions of Sex Offender Registration: 
Collateral Consequences and Community Experiences, 26 SOC. SPECTRUM 309, 314 (2006). 
194 Smith, 538 U.S. at 105. 
195 SCHRAM & MILLOY, supra note 168, at 13. 
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E. EFFECTS OF SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION 
The Court discussed research about the effects of sexual victimization 
only in the Kennedy capital punishment decision.  Table 5 presents six 
assertions the Court made in this case.  First, describing the effects of rape, 
the Court stated, “Rape has a permanent psychological, emotional, and 
sometimes physical impact on the child.”196  This assessment clearly 
accords with the findings from research, which consistently has identified 
such outcomes as post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, and suicide as 
resulting from sexual abuse.197 
  
 
196 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 435 (2008) (citing CHRISTOPHER BAGLEY & 
KATHLEEN KING, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: THE SEARCH FOR HEALING 2–24, 111–12 (1990); 
David Finkelhor & Angela Browne, Assessing the Long-Term Impact of Child Sexual Abuse: 
A Review and Conceptualization, in A HANDBOOK ON CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 55–60 (Lenore 
E.A. Walker ed., 1988)). 
197 Elizabeth Oddone Paolucci et al., A Meta-Analysis of Published Research on the 
Effects of Child Sexual Abuse, 135 J. PSYCHOL. 17, 30 (2001); see also TERRY, supra note 
121, at 115–18.  
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Table 5 
U.S. Supreme Court References to Research in Sex Offender Cases: 





“Rape has a permanent psychological, emotional, 
and sometimes physical impact on the child.”198	 Correct	 Kennedy	
“It is not at all evident that the child rape victim’s 
hurt is lessened when the law permits the death of 
the perpetrator.”199	
Correct	 Kennedy	
“Studies conclude that children are highly 
susceptible to suggestive questioning techniques 
like repetition, guided imagery, and selective 
reinforcement.”200	
Correct	 Kennedy	
“Underreporting is a common problem with respect 
to child sexual abuse.”201 Correct	 Kennedy	
“[O]ne of the most commonly cited reasons for 
nondisclosure is fear of negative consequences for 
the perpetrator, a concern that has special force 
where the abuser is a family member.”202	
Correct	 Kennedy	
“Assuming the offender behaves in a rational way, 
as one must to justify the penalty on grounds of 
deterrence, the penalty in some respects gives less 
protection, not more, to the victim, who is often the 
sole witness to the crime.”203	
Logical inference, 
but few studies 





198 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 435 (citing BAGLEY & KING, supra note 196, at 2–24, 111–12; 
Finkelhor & Browne, supra note 196, at 55–60). 
199 Id. at 442. 
200 Id. at 443 (citing Stephen J. Ceci & Richard D. Friedman, The Suggestibility of 
Children: Scientific Research and Legal Implications, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 33, 47 (2000); 
Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 523, 529 (2005); Jodi A. Quas et al., Repeated Questions, Deception, and 
Children’s True and False Reports of Body Touch, 12 CHILD MALTREATMENT 60, 61–66 
(2007)). 
201 Id. at 444 (citing Rochelle F. Hanson et al., Factors Related to the Reporting of 
Childhood Rape, 23 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 559, 564 (1999); Daniel W. Smith et al., 
Delay in Disclosure of Childhood Rape: Results from a National Survey, 24 CHILD ABUSE & 
NEGLECT 273, 278–79 (2000)). 
202 Id. at 445 (citing Tina B. Goodman-Brown et al., Why Children Tell: A Model of 
Children’s Disclosure of Sexual Abuse, 27 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 525, 527–28 (2003); 
Hanson et al., supra note 201, at 565–66; Smith et al., supra note 201, at 278–79)). 
203 Id. (citing Corey Rayburn, Better Dead than R(ap)ed?: The Patriarchal Rhetoric 
Driving Capital Rape Statutes, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1119, 1159–60 (2004)). 
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In this same decision, the Court also offered its opinion about the 
effects of a death penalty sanction on a sex crime victim.  Using Tina B. 
Goodman et al.’s study to suggest this view, the Court opined, “It is not at 
all evident that the child rape victim’s hurt is lessened when the law permits 
the death of the perpetrator. . . .”204  As the Court intimated, few studies 
exist that directly address this issue.  To illustrate, Jodi A. Quas et al. noted 
that “[s]urprisingly, little is known from scientific research about how legal 
involvement . . . affects children’s long-term mental health and legal 
attitudes.”205  Some accounts suggest that a significant proportion of sex 
crime victims “wanted the person they trusted or loved to get help, not for 
the offender to spend a mandated lengthy or life sentence behind bars.”206  
In short, the Court offers a balanced assessment of the literature examining 
the effects of sexual victimization on children. 
The Court also focused on the reliability of children’s testimony: 
“Studies conclude that children are highly susceptible to suggestive 
questioning techniques like repetition, guided imagery, and selective 
reinforcement.”207  Research largely supports this claim.  As C. J. Brainerd 
and V. F. Reyna averred in their review, suggestive questioning of children 
about sexual assaults “will yield answers that lead to criminal 
prosecutions . . . .  [C]hildren’s memories, especially young children’s, are 
highly susceptible to distortion from suggestive questioning.”208 
In describing the prevalence of reporting among child sex abuse 
victims, the Court wrote: “Underreporting is a common problem with 
respect to child sexual abuse.”209  That assessment echoes the findings from 
many studies, which typically indicate that, compared to other types of 
crime, sexual abuse of minors is extensively underreported.210  In Terry’s 
review, it was estimated that only one-third of all sex crimes are reported to 
 
204 Id. at 442 (later referencing Gail S. Goodman et al., Testifying in Criminal Court: 
Emotional Effects on Child Sexual Assault Victims, 57 MONOGRAPHS SOC’Y RES. CHILD DEV. 
1, 50, 62, 72 (1992); Brief of the National Ass’n of Social Workers et al. as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioner at 17–21, Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 435 (No. 07-343)). 
205 Jodi A. Quas et al., Childhood Sexual Assault Victims: Long-Term Outcomes After 
Testifying in Criminal Court, 70 MONOGRAPHS SOC’Y RES. CHILD DEV. 1, 1 (2005).  
206 TRACY VELÁZQUEZ, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE PURSUIT OF SAFETY: SEX OFFENDER 
POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 8 (2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
207 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 443 (citing Ceci & Friedman, supra note 200, at 47; Gross et 
al., supra note 200, at 529; Quas et al., supra note 200, at 61–66). 
208 C. J. BRAINERD & V. F. REYNA, THE SCIENCE OF FALSE MEMORY 295 (2005). 
209 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 444 (citing Hanson et al., supra note 201, at 564; Smith et al., 
supra note 201, at 278–79 (2000)).  
210 See, e.g., David Finkelhor & Richard K. Ormrod, Factors in the Underreporting of 
Crimes Against Juveniles, 6 CHILD MALTREATMENT 219, 226 (2001). 
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authorities.211  Studies comparing Uniform Crime Report (UCR) estimates 
of sex crime to NCVS estimates (albeit limited in measuring sexual 
victimization among those 12 and older) have found that only a minority of 
sexual offenses are reported to law enforcement.212  More precisely, one 
large national survey (n = 5,015) relying on interviews with minor 
respondents and proxies (i.e., caregivers) found that only 30% of sexual 
abuse incidents among children (ages 0 to 17) were reported to law 
enforcement in 1999.213   
In describing the factors contributing to underreporting, the Court 
stated: “[O]ne of the most commonly cited reasons for nondisclosure is fear 
of negative consequences for the perpetrator, a concern that has special 
force where the abuser is a family member.”214  The Court identified studies 
that have found nondisclosure to be prevalent when the perpetrator is a 
family member.  The studies on which the Court relied provide support for 
this assessment, and so, too, do other studies.215  For example, results from 
a study using NCVS data about individuals over the age of twelve who 
reported their sexual assaults to police indicate that victims were more 
likely to report the sexual abuse to police when the offenders were strangers 
(41%) than when they were family members or intimates (27%).216  Studies 
of college students who have experienced sexual victimization as teens or 
young adults also identify fear of retaliation from the offender as a 
significant barrier to reporting abuse.217 
Finally, and in contrast to the other evidence-based claims made in 
Kennedy, the Supreme Court discussed the application of the death penalty 
to rapists and whether such a punishment may remove a strong incentive for 
the rapist not to kill the victim.218  The Court noted that “[a]ssuming the 
 
211 TERRY, supra note 121, at 15. 
212 TIMOTHY C. HART & CALLIE RENNISON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, REPORTING CRIME TO THE POLICE, 1992-2000, at 4 (2003) (relaying that on 
average only 31% of sex offenses are reported to law enforcement annually).  
213 DAVID FINKELHOR ET AL., OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEXUALLY ASSAULTED CHILDREN: NATIONAL ESTIMATES AND 
CHARACTERISTICS 4, 5 (2008).  
214 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 445 (citing Goodman-Brown et al., supra note 202, at 527–28; 
Hanson et al., supra note 201, at 565–66; Smith et al., supra note 201, at 283–84). 
215 See generally Finkelhor et al., Police Reporting and Professional Help Seeking for 
Child Crime Victims: A Review, 6 CHILD MALTREATMENT 17, 21 (2001) (identifying 
underreporting of child sexual abuse in cases where offenders are known).  
216 HART & RENNISON, supra note 212, at 5 tbl.6.  
217 BONNIE FISHER ET AL., THE SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION OF COLLEGE WOMEN 23, 26 
(2000) (finding that 40% of women enrolled in colleges and universities do not report their 
sexual victimization because of “fear of reprisal by offender”).  
218 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 445. 
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offender behaves in a rational way, as one must to justify the penalty on 
grounds of deterrence, the penalty in some respects gives less protection to 
the victim, who is often the sole witness to the crime.”219  In this instance, 
the Court recognized the concept of marginal deterrence, relying on a 
specific passage from a law review article in which Corey Rayburn 
asserted: “When death is the penalty for rape and murder, a rapist has an 
increased incentive to kill the person he has raped.”220  Scholars have 
observed that such a theory, “for obvious reasons, would be extremely hard 
to prove,” but nonetheless constitutes a “common-sense argument.”221  
Notwithstanding that view, no empirical evidence directly bears on the 
Court’s claim.  There is, for example, no evidence that a penalty of death 
weighs more more or less heavily for sex offenders than a range of other 
factors when they decide to undertake a sex crime. 
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study extends prior research by examining the extent to which the 
U.S. Supreme Court, in its decisions on sex offenders, relies on social 
scientific evidence and does so in a manner that accurately accords with this 
evidence.  The salience of this focus stems from the Court’s role in 
affecting policy, the increasingly greater emphasis in recent decades on 
evidence-based policy, and the dramatic increase in state and federal 
legislation aimed at toughening the sanctions that can be applied to sex 
offenders.  The findings can be summarized briefly.  First, in all but one 
case on sex offenders decided during the past two decades, the Court 
included references to social science research.  Carr, a case involving 
challenges to SORNA legislation, constituted the exception.222  The 
remaining cases averaged approximately 3.3 citations to social scientific 
research per case, an estimate that falls within the range identified in prior 
studies that have focused on other types of criminal justice cases.223 
Second, the Court typically not only provided references to social 
scientific research but also provided accurate summaries of it.  At the same 
time, however, there were some instances in which the interpretations of 
research involved either incorrect claims or assertions that were misleading 
because they provided no relevant context.  As a result, some claims and 
assertions made by the Court gave the misleading appearance of being 
 
219 Id. (citing Rayburn, supra note 203, at 1159–60).  
220 Rayburn, supra note 203, at 1159. 
221 Yale Glazer, Child Rapists Beware! The Death Penalty and Louisiana’s Amended 
Aggravated Rape Statute, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 79, 105 n.189 (1997). 
222 Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229 (2010).  
223 See Acker, supra note 26, at 10 tbl.3; Acker, supra note 86, at 72 tbl.1. 
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evidence-based and thus of supporting more general lines of argument with 
seemingly clear justification, such as the need for states to toughen their 
approaches to punishing and monitoring sex offenders.  For example, in 
Smith, the Court asserted that it would be “conjecture” to argue that 
registered sex offender status results in employment discrimination or social 
stigma given that little evidence showed Alaska registrants were negatively 
affected.224  Yet, at the time of the decision, scholarship existed to suggest 
that registered sex offenders faced significant employment discrimination as 
an obstacle to reentry.225 
It perhaps should come as no surprise that some Supreme Court 
decisions rest on claims of questionable empirical veracity.  Certainly, 
many criminal justice policies have been undertaken based on faulty 
assessments of the need for such policies and the theories underlying 
them.226  At the same time, the Supreme Court’s role in affecting state sex 
offender policies suggests cause for concern.  For example, it underscores 
the problems, identified since Daubert,227 attendant to judicial evaluation of 
competing social science claims when judges have little training or 
experience in research methodology.  The findings here can be viewed as 
providing support for two opposing groups: those who view the Court as 
capable of sifting through the nuances of research and its salience for the 
constitutional issues involved in particular cases, and those who view the 
Court as at risk of undermining the legitimacy of its decisions by relying on 
research claims that are inaccurate or misleading. 
One direction for future research is to investigate the extent to which 
this concern extends to lower court rulings.  Given the controversial nature 
of many newer sex offender laws (e.g., residence restrictions, electronic 
monitoring, chemical castration, lifetime supervision), it is likely that new 
cases will arise in district and appellate courts that challenge their 
constitutionality and do so in part by making claims culled from the social 
scientific literature on sex offenders.  Studies are needed to examine the use 
of research findings in these cases, measuring whether the cited research is 
representative, whether the presentation of the findings is accurate, and 
whether the implications derived from the findings are based on the 
provision of sufficient context for making evidence-based claims about 
need or effectiveness. 
Another direction for research, one that may indirectly contribute to 
policy deliberations, is an investigation of how judges use social science 
 
224 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 100 (2003). 
225 See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
226 See MEARS, supra note 14, at 33–34. 
227 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
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research in their decisions in sex offender cases and in court cases more 
generally.  Threat theory argues that judges may intentionally avoid 
technical or complicated social science research since it represents a threat 
to their power and prestige.228  The extent to which this argument is 
empirically supported, however, remains largely unknown.  It also is 
unknown how judicial philosophy and political ideology can influence the 
way in which judges, including the Supreme Court Justices, interpret, 
weigh, and balance the research presented in testimony and briefs.  Not 
least, future research ideally will examine “confirmation bias” in 
decisions—that is, the potential for judges to find or use research in ways 
that reinforce their beliefs.229  Judges, of course, are human, and, as such, 
they are presumably as likely as others to allow preconceptions to guide 
their selection, weighting, and interpretation of scientific evidence.  In 
medicine, for example, confirmation bias and other types of cognitive 
decisionmaking errors can influence medical decisions.230  However, it 
remains unknown to what extent this problem affects the Judicial Branch. 
Although the Court may be overlooked as a national policymaker, its 
decisions shape criminal laws.231  In four of the cases examined in this 
study, the Court upheld controversial policies—civil commitment 
(Kansas232), registry/notification (Connecticut Department of Public 
Safety;233 Smith234), and compulsory treatment for sex offenders 
(McKune235).  In the remaining cases, the Court limited some aspects of 
these laws—virtual child pornography (Ashcroft236), a statute of limitation 
law (Stogner237), a law involving the death penalty for child rapists 
(Kennedy238), and a challenge to SORNA (Carr239).  How these decisions 
may have been affected by different assessments of the social science 
literature constitutes a critical and promising avenue of scholarly inquiry. 
 
 
228 Tanford, supra note 33, at 152. 
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233 Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 8 (2003). 
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